1 engaged with the Taliban, and in Pakistan, where, except for the FATA, the U.S. is not directly engaged with the Taliban. We find that there is no significant impact of drone strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda attacks in Afghanistan but that there is a significant impact of drone strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda attacks in Pakistan. This impact varies from a positive vengeance effect in the first week following a drone strike to a negative deterrent/incapacitation effect in the second week following a drone strike, when we examine the likelihood of a terrorist attack by the Taliban. The impact is negative in both the first and second weeks following a drone strike, when we examine the number of terrorist attacks by the Taliban. We find that drone strikes continue to have a strong impact on terrorist attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Pakistan when we look at different time periods or lag structures.
In Section 1 of the paper we describe the background of the conflict involving the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and in Section 2 we describeour data sources. Section 3 presents our econometric approach and Section 4 gives the baseline estimation results. In Section 5 we perform some robustness checks on the baseline estimation results and in Section 6 we present some extensions regarding successful and unsuccesful drone strikes as well as actions by specific terrorist actors. Section 7 concludes.
Background
The Taliban consist of ethnic Pashtun tribes found along the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Data
We use the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) database collected by the National Counter Terrorism Center as our source of terrorist incidents in Afghanistan and Pakistan from January 2007 to December 2010, where the perpetrators were identified in the database as Taliban. 4 As a robustness check we examine whether the incidents reported by the WITS database are consistent with other databases on terrorist incidents such as the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland and the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. 5 While we do not find a perfect correlation in the number of terrorist attacks carried out by the Taliban in the different databases, we did find the WITS database to have the best coverage of such incidents. For instance, we found an almost perfect correlation between the suicide attacks attributed to the Taliban in WITS with a proprietary administrative data source which documented such attacks, while the other databases entirely miss large numbers of such incidents.
Incidents in the WITS database consist of all "incidents in which sub-national or clandestine groups or individuals deliberately or recklessly attacked civilians or noncombatants (including military personnel and assets outside war zones and war like settings)." An important consideration concerns what constitutes a "terrorist act." To be included in the WITS database terrorists must have initiated and executed the attack, with spontaneous hate crimes and genocides being excluded from the database. A potential problem in using the database is that it is sometimes difficult to separate crime from terrorist act. In general, a crime committed in support of terrorism is included in the database, but not otherwise.
Data on incidence and fatalities arising from drone strikes comes from the New America Foundation, which collects and provides data on incidence, day, location, fatalities (including those of militant leaders), intended target and source of information. 6 The sources from which the data is compiled include media organizations such as the New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, news services and networks such as the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, CNN and BBC, English language media from Pakistan such as the Daily Times, Dawn and the News and GEO TV.
In Table 1 we show the frequency of drone strikes by the U.S. and terrorist attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from 2005 to 2010. It is clear that there is an increase in both drone strikes and overall terrorist attacks in this period, although the share of terrorist attacks occurring in Pakistan has declined.
The success rate of drone strikes has declined substantially, as has the share of suicide attacks in terrorist actions.
We present this information at a higher frequency in Figure 1 and December 2010. From this, it can be seen that most of the terrorist attacks are geographically concentrated in the north and north west of the country, close to the FATA where the drone strikes take place.
Because Al-Qaeda has directly claimed responsibility for a very small number of terrorist attacks (4 in Afghanistan and 9 in Pakistan in our sample period), in the rest of the paper we will refer to the "Taliban" as the terrorist actor in the analysis.
Framework and Econometric Strategy
To examine the effects of drone strikes on Taliban violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we posit a simple vector autoregressive model similar to that of Jaeger and Paserman (2008) . We are particularly interested in whether drone strikes reduce subsequent Taliban violence For the Taliban in Afghanistan, we estimate reaction functions of the form
and in Pakistan,
where T A t , T P t and D t represent period t terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan, terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan and drone strikes, respectively, p is the maximum number of lags that have a non-zero effect and X t is a vector of variables that may shift the reaction function up or down or change the parameters of the reaction function. For the sake of symmetry we also estimate and report the reaction functions for the United States government in its exercise of drone strikes in the FATA:
Note, however, that it is unlikely (as we also find in the data) that drone strikes are strategically affected by the incidence and intensity of terrorist attacks by the Taliban in either Afghanistan or Pakistan, and more likely based on intelligence gathered on high value Taliban and terrorist targets. To the extent that this intelligence gathering (and the timing of drone strikes) is independent the unobserved determinants of Taliban actions, our estimates of these parameters in the Taliban reaction functions can be viewed the causal effects of drone strikes on Taliban actions (Granger 1969 ).
In both of the Taliban equations, we pay particular attention to the signs of the coefficients. We hypothesize that drone strikes can lead to subsequent reductions in terrorist activity if they incapacitate the Taliban or deter the Taliban from further violence. On the other hand, drone strikes may induce further violence through vengeance. If the coefficients on the D t−1 , . . . , D t−p variables are negative, then the incapacitation and deterrence effects dominate (on net) while if they are positive then the vengeance effect dominates (on net). We also estimate a specification (in section 6) in which we separate successful drone strikes (ones which killed a militant leader) from those which were not successful (one which did not kill a militant leader). We expect the coefficients associated with successful drone strikes to capture the incapacitation, deterrence and vengeance effects while the coefficients associated with unsuccessful drone strikes potentially capture the deterrence and vengeance effects only, provided of course that unsuccessful drone strikes do not have any impact on the operational capabilities of the Taliban. Our empirical strategy also allows us to test whether there is any co-ordination in Taliban violence across the border in Afghanistan and Pakistan by exploiting geographic variation in drone strikes, and examine whether drone strikes in Pakistan affect terrorism in Afghanistan and whether drone strikes in Afghanistan affect terrorism in Pakistan.
Baseline Estimation Results
We estimate the reaction functions (as defined in Section 3) by estimating OLS regressions where we correct for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms using Newey-West standard errors. We choose a lag length of twenty one days in our baseline estimation, where the choice of lag length is based on likelihood ratio tests that we carried out on the initial estimations. We estimate two different specifications: in the first specification (which we refer to as the incidence specification), T A t , T P t and D t are dummy variables for whether there was any terrorist attack by the Taliban in Afghanistan, by the Taliban in Pakistan or whether there was any drone strike on day t. In the second specification (which we refer to as the levels specification), T A t , T P t and D t are the number of terrorist attacks by the 
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jointly significantly different from zero. We do find that coefficients on all lags of terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan in the levels specification are jointly significantly different from zero, indicating that there is likely to be some coordination between the Taliban groups in the two countries. Table 4 gives the estimation results of the reaction functions of the Taliban in Pakistan, structured in the same was as in Table 2 . We find strong effects of drone strikes on subsequent Taliban violence in Pakistan, although the sign of these effects are somewhat mixed. We find that a terrorist attack by the Taliban in Pakistan is 8.2% more likely to occur five days after a drone strike but 8.9% less likely to occur thirteen days after a drone strike and these effects are statistically significant at the 2.5% level of significance. There are also 0.120 fewer terrorist attacks two days after a drone strike and 0.130 fewer terrorist attacks twelve days after a drone strike. These effects are significant at the 1% level.
When we test for joint significance of all lags of drone strikes on terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan we find that these lags are jointly significant in explaining such attacks in both the incidence and levels specifications. We also find that Taliban violence in Pakistan is negatively associated with Taliban violence in Afghanistan; a terrorist attack is 9.3% less likely to occur sixteen days after a terrorist attack in Afghanistan and 0.023 fewer terrorist attacks occur sixteen days after one terrorist attack in Afghanistan. In a test of joint significance of all lags of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan we find these lags to be jointly significant in the levels specification but not in the incidence specification.
We next carry out a number of robustness checks to determine whether these baseline results persist when we when we vary the lag structure, the level of aggregation, and focus on lethal Taliban attacks. 8 5 Robustness Checks
Lag Structures
It is possible that the baseline Granger-causality results that we reported are dependent on the lag length that we chose in the estimation of our reaction functions. We chose the lag length based on likelihood ratio statistics. To check the robustness of our results, however, we also examine whether choosing a different lag length would change our results. In Table 5 , we present results using lags of seven and fourteen days.
Overall, we find little change by estimating models with p = 7 or p = 14.
Time Aggregation
In our baseline specification, we examined the short-run (3 week) dynamics of violence and found that there is little effect of drone strikes on Taliban actions in Afghanistan and a significant, but somewhat mixed, effect on Taliban actions in Pakistan. Unlike the Palestinians in Israel we expect that the Taliban has somewhat greater ability to act in Afghanistan, in particular. But it may be that using high-frequency data masks some longer-term reaction (or deterrence) of Taliban actions. To explore this issue, we estimate models similar to those in Tables 2 through 4 , but using weekly and monthly aggregation of the data.
Here we find some differences with our baseline specification. In particular, we find no significant effects of drone strikes on Taliban violence in Pakistan when we aggregate to weeks or months. At the monthly frequency, we do find a significant effect of drone strikes on Taliban violence in Afghanistan. In this regression, the coefficient on drone strikes is negatively and highly significant -indicating that drone strikes may have a deterrence or incapacitation effect on longer-run violence in Afghanistan.
Outcome Measure
We have thus far measured intensity of Taliban actions only by using the incidence or number of terrorist attacks. To explore this issue further, we now look at two somewhat different outcomes by examining either those Taliban actions that resulted in at least one fatality as well as only those in which a suicide attack occurred. We use data on incident description and fatalities in WITS to construct the incidence and number of lethal and suicide terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan and in Pakistan.
The tests of joint significance are reported in table 7. The effect of drone strikes on both lethal and suicide attacks in Afghanistan is similar to the baseline specification -there is no effect on either incidence or levels. The results in Pakistan are somewhat more mixed, where we find that drone strikes have a jointly significant (at the 5% level) effect on lethal attacks, but no significant effect on either the incidence or level of suicide attacks there. This is consistent with the evidence from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, For the Haqqani faction of the Taliban the reaction functions we estimate are of the form
where T there appear to be short-term deterrent/incapacitation effect of drone strikes in the first week but large vengeance effects in the second week following a drone strike for the Haqqani faction of the Taliban.
For the Mehsud faction of the Taliban the reaction functions we estimate are of the form
where T M ehsud The estimation results are reported in table 9, with the second column giving the estimation results from the incidence specification and the fourth column giving the estimation results from the levels specification. We find that a terrorist attack in FATA is 17.3% more likely eleven days after a drone strike in South Waziristan but that it is 14.1% less likely fourteen days after a drone strike in South Waziristan.
There are also 0.142 more terrorist attacks fourteen days after a drone strike (everything else constant).
Overall there appear to be vengeance effects but also large deterrent/incapacitation effects occurring in the second week after a drone strikes for the Mehsud faction of the Taliban.
Successful and Unsuccessful Drone Strikes
Jaeger and Paserman (2009) found differential effects of successful and unsuccessful assassination attempts of Palestinian leaders. We employ a similar strategy here by exploiting information on whether or not a particular drone strike was successful in eliminating a militant leader. By decomposing the drone strikes into those which were successful and not successful, we are able to investigate the individual deterrence and incapacitation effects of drone strikes on terrorist violence.
For the Taliban in Afghanistan the reaction functions we estimate are of the form,
where D S t and D U t represent drone strikes which were successful and which were not successful in killing a militant leader at time t, respectively. p is The estimation results are reported in table 10, with the second column giving the estimation results from the incidence specification and the fourth column giving the estimation results from the levels specification. We find that there is no large and significant impact of unsuccessful drone strikes on terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan, but a terrorist attack in Afghanistan is 8.8% more likely five days after a successful drone strike. This indicates that vengeance effects may be particularly strong when drone strikes are able to kill militant leaders for Taliban violence in Afghanistan.
For the Taliban in Pakistan the reaction functions we estimate are of the form,
with the variables defined as above. The estimation results are reported in table 11, with the second column giving the estimation results from the incidence specification and the fourth column giving the estimation results from the levels specification. We find that a terrorist attack in Pakistan is 17.8% less likely to occur three days after a successful drone strike, but also that a terrorist attack in Pakistan is 13% less likely to occur twelve days after an unsuccessful drone strike and that there are 0.151 fewer terrorist attacks in Pakistan eleven days after one unsuccessful drone strike (all else constant). These effects are statistically significant. Note, however, that the magnitude of all the coefficients is not very different across successful and unsuccessful drone strikes. It appears that there is little incapacitation effect of the Taliban due to a lost militant leader. On the other hand, strong negative effects associated with unsuccessful drone strikes indicate a potential effect of drone strikes for Taliban violence in Pakistan. This is also consistent with conventional wisdom, while the drone strikes may do little to damage the operational capabilities of the Taliban (there are always other Taliban recruits to take the place of a militant leader killed in a drone strike), but the show of strength through these strikes may reduce subsequent terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan.
Conclusion
We examine the dynamics of the conflict involving the Taliban across Afghanistan and Pakistan and the use of drone strikes as a counter-terrorism policy to combat the Taliban. We test the following hypotheses: We find that there is little significant impact of drone strikes on Taliban attacks in Afghanistan but that there is a significant impact of drone strikes on Taliban attacks in Pakistan. This impact varies from a positive vengeance effect in the first week following a drone strike to a negative deterrent/incapacitation effect in the second week following a drone strike, when we examine the incidence of terrorist attacks by the Taliban. The impact is negative in both the first and second week following a drone strike, when we examine the number of terrorist attacks by the Taliban.
We also examine whether drone strikes in North Waziristan have an impact on Taliban Our work has relevance for the current US drones policy in Pakistan as well as possible use of the policy in other parts of the world. It also provides empirical evidence of deterrence effects of a specific counter-terrorism policy across different factions of a larger group with a common ideology (the Taliban).
We find that these deterrent effects can vary across the different factions, with vengeance effects being stronger for some factions than for others. Insofar as the incapacitation effect of the drone strikes comes from targeted killing of Taliban leaders, we find that such an incapacitation effect (in the sense of reducing Taliban violence) is minimal but that there is some deterrent effect of drone strikes on Taliban violence.
Our most important finding is that drone strikes matter, but only for Taliban violence in Pakistan. There is little or no effect of drone strikes on Taliban violence across the border in Afghanistan.
13 4 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors. 5 * significant at the 5% level, * * significant at the 2.5% level, * * * significant at the 1% level. 4 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors. 5 * significant at the 5% level, * * significant at the 2.5% level, * * * significant at the 1% level. 4 Regressions include day of week indicators. 5 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors. 6 * significant at the 5% level, * * significant at the 2.5% level, * * * significant at the 1% level. 4 Regressions include day of week indicators. 5 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors. 6 * significant at the 5% level, * * significant at the 2.5% level, * * * significant at the 1% level. 4 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors. 5 * significant at the 5% level, * * significant at the 2.5% level, * * * significant at the 1% level. 4 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors. 5 * significant at the 5% level, * * significant at the 2.5% level, * * * significant at the 1% level.
